Abstract: Digital watermarking is an innovative technique for intellectual property protection (IPP) of Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) designs. However, many of these techniques usually need manually extract marks from binary bit-files by the FPGA tool or exhaustive search to find out marks in the design, which results in inefficiency of the watermark verification. This paper presents a method to fast verify the authorship through extracting the content of the watermarked lookup tables from a binary bit-file. We demonstrate the proposed method on several Xilinx Virtex-II devices, and experimental results on the watermarked designs from the IWLS 2005 benchmarks show that the verification of authorship has high efficiency. LETTER intellectual property protection through multiple small watermarks," Proc 36th
Introduction
As reuse-based design methodology has prevailed in integrated circuit (IC) design field, the IC design industry is confronted with the increasing threat of intellectual property (IP) infringement which results in loss of revenue and market share. Hence, how to protect reusable IP cores effectively has become a serious problem. Watermarking is a comprehensive mechanism implemented to protect IP from illegal reuse in many fields, such as IC [1, 11] and audio [2] . In the open literatures, watermarking procedures for protecting IP cores can be roughly categorized into the constraint based methods and the additive methods.
The constraint based methods usually introduce additional constraints to yield the new watermarked design during the design procedure [1] . The major drawback of these techniques is the limitation on verification possibilities of the watermarked core. Hence, it is difficult to detect the watermark from the bit-file. The additive watermarking methods embed the owners watermark into unused slices (i.e. non-functional slices) at physical layout level [4, 5] or embed the IP buyer's fingerprint together with the owner's watermark into unused slices to create a buyer-specific instance [3] . In 2012, D. Saha et al. [6] proposed a significant zero-knowledge protocol VerifyZKP to ensure trustworthy yet leakage-proof public verification based on the marks hidden in unused CLBs to protect FPGA IP cores. Although [4, 5, 6] can extract the watermark in all its posterior design levels, they require manually extracting marks from the bit-file core by FPGA tools or exhaustive search to find out marks in the design to verify the authorship. Hence, the process of watermarking verification is inefficient.
In this paper, an efficient watermarking verification method is proposed to extract the watermark fast from the bit-stream file through lookup table content analysis so that the authorship can be fast and effectively proven.
Besides, our watermarking scheme has no traceability issue since the watermark is embedded into the FPGA bit-file.
2 The proposed watermarking method
Watermark embedding
The watermark preparation algorithm uses a secure hash function to reduce the length of signature S, and then the hashed signature is encrypted by a public key algorithm with the key K to generate the watermark W. Finally, W is embedded into the design I in the position R by creating a watermarked work ┑ I. If the target FPGA of the design can store t-bit configuration string in each LUT, then W is divided into l segments (each segment stores t-bit mark). The value of t is 16 on Xilinx Virtex-II FPGAs, i. e., each ILUT accommodates 16 bit marks.
To embed the watermark, we need to get the information about the content of the watermark and the embedding positions. The content of the watermark is generated in the watermark preparation phase. The specific position where w i is embedded is determined by a pseudo random sequence R, which is generated by a pseudo random sequence generator. The process of watermark embedding is the same as [6] . The main difference is that our method embeds marks into ILUTs [7] at bit-file level instead of nonfunctional slices at physical layout level.
Watermark verification
In this section, we discuss how to fast extract the content of watermarked ILUTs from a binary configuration bit-stream file. Firstly, we obtain the configuration bit-file of the FPGA in the design. Secondly, according to the method of extracting the content of LUTs from a bit-file [8] , we show our method to compute the byte address of the watermarked ILUTs in the configuration packet of the bit-stream, and then we extract the content of the watermarked ILUTs to acquire the embedded watermark. Finally, decrypt W to provide authorship proof.
To control unauthorized access, the configuration bit-stream in the bitfile of FPGA designs may remain in encrypted form, but it is still possible to extract watermarks from it using the proposed approach. The encrypted bit-stream is loaded into FPGA and decrypted by the decryption unit in FPGA, and the bit-stream can be attained by monitoring the serial line between the FPGA and the bit-stream storing EPROM during configuration [5, 8] . Then the unencrypted bit-file is available and our proposed method is applied on it to extract watermarks. If partial encryption [9] is applied to generate the encrypted file where only the bit-stream except the marks is encrypted, our method can be directly applied to it.
We have experimented with the proposed method on Xilinx Virtex-II and Virtex-II Pro FPGA bit-files. A bit-stream file is structured in packets. One of these packets includes the configuration content, which are divided into frames. These frames are the smallest addressable segments of the Virtex-II configuration memory space. Virtex-II devices are configured by loading application-specific configuration data into internal memory. Configuration frames are grouped into six column types that correspond roughly to physical device resources. In all Virtex-II devices, there are the same configuration column types: IOB, IOI, CLB, GCLK, BRAM, and BRAM Interconnect. In each configuration frame, there is a unique 32-bit address that is composed of a block address (BA), a major address (MJA), a minor address (MNA) and a byte number. Block Address 0 contains all GCLK, IOB, IOI, and CLB configuration columns [10] . The major address identifies a specific column within a block, and the minor address identifies a specific frame within a column.
All Virtex-II devices have the same number of IOB, IOI, and GCLK columns. The number of columns and frames per column type for several Virtex-II devices is given in [10] . Figure 1 depicts the CLB frame columns in the Packet of a Virtex-II FPGA's Bit-file. #CLB is the number of CLB columns. The two specific frames (frame 2 and frame 3) in each of the CLB column are used for storing the content of LUTs. Figure 2 clearly shows the position arrangement of Slices in the i-th CLB column for a Virtex-II FPGA. The correction between Figure 1 and Figure 2 is that the frame 2 (denoted by the blue rectangle) of the i-th CLB frame column in Figure 1 is used to store the content of LUTs of the left slice column in Figure 2 , and the frame 3 (denoted by the orange rectangle) is for that of the right slice column in Figure 2 . S r is the number of slice rows in the FPGA.
The positions of LUTs in a frame are shown in Figure 3 . The LUT content for one slice consists of 5 bytes, including two bytes G-LUT, two bytes F-LUT and a separate byte. The G-LUT bit order is reversed, while the F-LUT bit order is not. According to the structure of the bit-stream file described above, the calculation method for the byte address of the G-LUT in the slice (x, y) is given in Equation (1).
where, N offset (y) denotes the byte offsets from the beginning of the target frame, as shown in Equation (2) . The target frame is defined as the frame that includes all the content of the LUTs in slice column x. N Frames (x) indicates the total number of frames before the target frame, as shown in Equation (3). F Len denotes the frame length, which is given in [10] .
where, N GCLK , N IOB , N IOI , and N CLB denote the number of frames of each GCLK, IOB, IOI and CLB column respectively. CF LUT0 denotes the first frame in the CLB column, thus the value of CF LUT0 is 1. (x mod 2) indicates that the LUT content of the left slice column (x is even) is stored in the frame 2, while that of the right slice column (x is odd) stored in the frame 3.
Combining (1), (2) and (3), we can use (4) to calculate the byte address of G-LUTs in the configuration packet of the bit-stream.
As shown in Figure 3 , the byte address of F-LUT is three bytes more offsets than G-LUT in the same slice. Hence,
The position set of the watermarked ILUTs R is recorded in the watermark embedding process (section 2.1). The position of the i-th watermarked ILUT r i = (x i , y i , z), where z = 0 or 1, (x i , y i ) denotes the coordinate of watermarked slice which the i-th watermarked ILUT consists in. If z = 0, G-LUT is watermarked, else FLUT is watermarked. With r i , we can calculate the addresses of the i-th watermarked ILUT in ┑ B (the watermarked bitfile) by (4) or (5), then the watermark can be extracted and decoded from the bit-stream easily according to the byte addresses of the watermarked ILUTs. The watermark extracting algorithm is shown in Figure 4 . The time complexity is O(l), where l is the number of watermarked LUTs. For each watermarked ILUT, marks are extracted in steps 2~15. Finally, we recombine all the extracted marks into W (step 16), and then decode W into S (step 17), which can provide the authorship proof. When the IP vendors suspect that their IP has been infringed, they can apply for a neutral third-party organization to extract the watermark from the IP core. Table I and Table II show that our watermarking embedding method introduces zero area and timing overhead. Area overhead is measured by the added Slice. ILUTs are used to embed marks and consist in functional slices which have been used in the FPGA design. Additionally, these ILUTs have no function and have been reported "used" before watermarking in the Place and Route Report, which is generated by Xilinx ISE tool [7] . Hence, there is essentially no area overhead required. Timing overhead is measured by the Minimum Period (MP) degradation. Timing Analyzer (Xilinx tool) is used to analyze minimum period. As shown in Table II , minimum period is unchanged, so the method has zero timing overhead. However, as shown in Table III , some of the "setup to clock clk" of clk in the design are affected after embedding 256 bits marks, so our method has routing overhead. This can be explained that we change part of the net connection of adjacent functional LUTs since more interconnection is added between watermarked ILUTs and don't care inputs of functional LUTs, which slightly impacts to routing of the original design.
As shown in Table IV , the CPU time requirements of the watermark extracting remain in the range from 0.031 to 0.078 s for the chosen benchmark.
Fig. 4. The watermark extracting algorithm
Watermarking methods that embedding marks into unused slices (i.e. non-functional slices) have been proven robust in [5, 6] . Hence, our method has the same security level with them since our method embeds marks into ILUTs instead of non-functional slices.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a method to efficiently extract the watermark from binary bit-files to address the issue of inefficacy of verification. The extraction of the embedded watermark was demonstrated on Xilinx Virtex-II FPGAs. For other FPGA devices or vendors we expect that similar techniques can be used to find rules of how to extract the embedded watermark. The experimental results showed that the process of watermark extracting is fast and does not require any extra hardware. 
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